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Summary
Drug related incidents are a common form of reported medical errors. This paper reviews the critical
incidents related to drug errors reported from themain operating theatre suite in a teaching hospital in
a developing country from January 1997 to December 2002. Each report was evaluated individually
by two reviewers using a structured process. During this period, 44 874 anaesthetics were admini-
stered; 768 critical incidents were reported, 165 (21%) of which were related to drug errors. Und-
erdosage, side-effect ⁄ drug reaction and syringe swap were the most common. A total of 76% were
classified as preventable; 56% due to human error and 19% due to system error. High risk incidents
accounted for 10% of all drug errors and most of these were related to the use of neuromuscular
blocking drugs. This analysis has been found useful in addressing some issues about priorities.
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Incident reporting is one of the techniques used in quality
assurance programmes for improving patient outcome.
Critical incident analysis was introduced to anaesthesia
practice by Cooper et al. [1] in 1978 and is now firmly
established. This analysis can be used for auditing work
practice, for correction of factors contributing to the
incident and for identification of recurrent problems [2].
To date, the largest published series has been reported by
the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) [3]. In
an analysis of the first 2000 incident reports of AIMS, one
of the common categories of incidents reported was drug
errors, which formed 32% of the incidents [4]. There is a
need to study these adverse drug events further and to
identify the types of error and types of adverse outcomes
related to preventable events. A study from the USA
looked at 10 published papers related to preventable drug
events and reported a median [range] preventability rate
for adverse drug errors in hospitals of 35% [19–73%].
The aim of our review was to assess the incidence of
adverse and potential adverse events related to drugs used
in anaesthesia in a university hospital in a developing
country and to analyse avoidable events in order to
develop prevention strategies.
Methods
The Institutional Ethical Committee did not require
approval of the project, which was carried out according
to local guidelines. Our hospital is a 500-bed urban,
university-affiliated hospital with an approximate current
annual workload of 9000 surgical patients (annual number
of anaesthetics given 7883–8882). It has a main operating
theatre suite with 10 operating theatres covering all
anaesthetic subspecialties including cardiac, neurosurgery
and paediatrics, two daycare and one obstetric operating
theatre.
The anaesthesia providers are 21 full time and three
part time consultants, 10 senior registrars and 36 residents
in a structured 5-year residency programme. Assistance in
the operating theatre is provided by anaesthetic techni-
cians. Anaesthetic drugs are drawn by the anaesthesia
residents for each patient before induction of anaesthesia.
A specified floor stock of all anaesthetic drugs is kept in a
storage area in the operating theatre suite. A drug trolley
of commonly used anaesthetic drugs is also available in
each operating theatre.
The critical incident monitoring programme was intro-
duced in the main operating theatre suite in 1996 on an
anonymous and voluntary basis. Critical incident forms are
available in every operating theatre and are ‘posted’ in a
locked box kept in the recovery room area, from which
they are collected by the Critical Incident Coordinator
every month. These forms are then presented in a
departmental critical incident meeting on a quarterly basis.
For the purpose of reporting, a critical incident is defined as
any untoward or preventable mishap which is associated
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with the administration of general or regional anaesthesia
and which leads to or could have led to an undesirable
patient outcome [6].
The data from these forms are added to a central
computerised data base on EPI INFO 6. This database was
reviewed from 1997 to 2002 for all drug related events
to determine the frequency, type of error, basic cause,
preventability and associated risk. Each report was
evaluated individually. Using a structured process, the
reports were coded by two independent reviewers
(consultant anaesthetists), as preventable or unprevent-
able; they also coded the reports into the following basic
causes:
Code 1: Drug present in an inappropriate location, e.g.
present in wrong box.
Code 2: Problems related to drug labelling including
wrong labelling, wrong concentration on label or pres-
ence of unlabelled drugs in the room.
Code 3: Overdosage. Drug given in dose more than
indicated in literature or overdosage due to dilution error.
Code 4: Underdosage. This also included the human
error if the anaesthetist forgot to give a particular drug.
Underdosage because of extravasation or disconnection of
apparatus was included in this category.
Code 5: Syringe swap errors, e.g. a drawn drug with
proper labelling, accidentally given instead of another
drawn drug.
Code 6: Drug drawn is given when not indicated, or at
the wrong time, or wrong drug injected (except for
syringe swap).
Code 7: Drug reaction or side-effects.
Code 8: Drug not effective after appropriate dosage.
Code 9: Miscellaneous, including delay in availability
or delay in onset or recovery, or if the event did not fit in
any of the above categories.
The reports were also classified into human error,
equipment failure, system error or drug side-effect ⁄ com-
plications. Human error was defined as situations where
established practice was not followed and related to
formulation and execution of a decision; system error was
where clinical practice was badly formulated, or equip-
ment ⁄ design error where equipment or workplace design
was flawed [7]. The risk was graded as follows:
No risk, i.e. an incident without any potential risk for
the patient.
Low risk, an incident which could have led to
reversible damage to the patient.
Medium risk, an incident which could have led to
irreversible damage to the patient.
High risk, a potentially fatal incident [8].
In cases of discrepancy between the two evaluators, the
incident was rediscussed between the evaluators and a
consensus reached.
Results
The total number of anaesthetics given in the main
operating theatre suite during the audit period was
44 874. In all, 768 critical incidents were reported during
this period, 165 of which were drug related, which
constitutes 21% of critical incidents and an estimated rate
of 3.6 drug related events per 1000 anaesthetics. The
annual breakdown in shown in Figure 1.
Further breakdown into coded groups is given in
Table 1. The highest number of incidents was related to
underdosage, followed by side-effects ⁄ drug reaction and
syringe swap. Both the reviewers classified 66% of the
events as preventable. Classification of incidents showed
that 56% were due to human error, 19% due to system
error, 4% due to equipment error and 21% due to known
drug side-effects. Ten percent of the incidents were
labelled as high risk, 45% as medium risk and 45% as low
risk. None of the incidents was labelled as no risk by the
reviewers. The list of high risk cases is given in Table 2.
The administration of a long acting neuromuscular
blocker instead of a narcotic was reported four times.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
N
um
be
r o
f I
nc
id
en
ts
Figure 1 Number of drug related incidents in relation to total
reported critical incidents. Total critical incidents per year
(white bars). Drug related critical incidents (black bars).
Table 1 Categories of drug related errors (values are number of
incidents).
Drug error (Code) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Drug in inappropriate
location (1)
1 0 1 2 0 1 5
Problems with
labelling (2)
1 2 2 0 2 3 10
Overdosage (3) 2 1 8 5 5 2 23
Underdosage (4) 1 6 6 11 2 9 35
Syringe swap (5) 3 1 4 2 7 9 26
Wrong drug or
wrong timing (6)
0 2 5 2 3 3 15
Drug side-effects or
reaction (7)
1 4 7 3 5 9 29
Drug not effective (8) 0 2 0 5 1 4 12
Miscellaneous (9) 0 0 3 1 4 2 10
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The pharmacological group of drugs involved in these
incidents is listed in Table 3. The highest percentage of
incidents reported were related to the neuromuscular
blocking drugs (41%), followed by a group of miscella-
neous drugs (15%) and induction agents. The miscella-
neous group included neostigmine, glyceryl trinitrate,
hydralazine, protamine, antibiotics, mannitol, ephedrine,
insulin, metoclopramide, potassium chloride, atropine
and hydrocortisone.
Although incidents related to all neuromuscular
blockers were reported, the highest number (31 inci-
dents, 45%) involved atracurium by either bolus or
infusion.
The incidents reported in the first 3 years (1997–99)
were compared to the incidents reported in the later
period (2000–2002) to see whether any change in trends
had occurred (Table 4). More errors of underdosage and
syringe swaps were reported during the later period.
Discussion
Critical incident analysis is a method of gathering
information that allows the identification of mechanisms
and contributing factors, and may be helpful in the
formulation of strategies to prevent recurrence. This
simple quality improvement and risk reduction measure
can also help improve the standard of anaesthetic care in
developing countries, where the low running cost is
particularly important [9]. Drug related incidents have
been reported in various studies [10, 11] and have
recently been the topic of a systematic review [12]. Drug
related incidents form 7–32% of reported errors
[4, 13, 14]. Human error accounted for 51% of our drug
related incidents. This is in accordance with findings in
other studies. Short et al. reported that 80% of critical
incidents associated with anaesthesia in general are caused
by human error [14]. The same appears to be true for the
drug related incidences, where the majority are due to
human error.
Underdosage of drugs was the most common incident
reported. Several reasons were cited: anaesthesia mach-
ine fault, faulty vaporiser, flowmeter not turned on at
Table 2 Drug related events labelled as high risk.
Drug group Incidents
Neuromuscular
blocking agents
Suxamethonium mixed in propofol
instead of lidocaine
Suxamethonium instead of atropine
given at the time of reversal
Neuromuscular blocker given
instead of narcotic at induction*
Neuromuscular blocker given
instead of saline flush*
Neostigmine given instead of
atracurium at induction
Inhalational agents Halothane induced ventricular
tachycardia
Severe hypotension with sevoflurane
Local anaesthetics Bupivacaine present in metaclopromide
box
Apnoea secondary to caudal
injection of bupivacaine
Miscellaneous drugs Potassium chloride present in
another drug box
Severe hypotension related to
inadequate steroid replacement
Severe hypotension following
injection of ampicillin
Atropine underdose leading to
severe bradycardia at reversal
Glyceryl trinitrate present
in midazolam box
Hydralazine given instead of
midazolam for sedation
Protamine injection causing
severe bronchospasm
Glyceryl trinitrate given instead
of phenylepherine
Fluids ⁄ blood
products
Haemaccel related anaphylaxis*
Fresh frozen plasma given to
wrong patient
*Event occurred more than once.
Table 4 Drug related critical incidents: comparison of two
periods (values are number of incidents).
Drug error 1997–99 2000–2002
Drug in inappropriate location 2 3
Problems with labelling 5 5
Overdosage of drug 11 12
Underdosage of drug 13 22
Syringe swap 8 18
Wrong drug given or wrong timing 7 8
Known drug side-effects or reaction 12 17
Drug not effective 2 10
Miscellaneous 3 7
Table 3 Pharmacological group of drugs involved in drug
related critical incidents (values are number of incidents).
Pharmacological
drug group n = 165
Sedatives 3
Induction agent 17
Narcotics 13
Neuromuscular blockers 68
Local anaesthetics 13
Inhalational agents 14
Intravenous fluids 4
Miscellaneous 25
More than two drugs 6
Drug not documented 2
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induction, extravasation of drugs due to faulty intraven-
ous cannulation technique, disconnection of intravenous
line which went unnoticed, malfunction of syringe
pumps due to human or equipment error, and the drug
being ineffective even when given in an appropriate dose.
The other errors reported were side-effects or drug
reactions, followed by syringe swap. The most common
drugs involved in syringe swap were neuromuscular
blocking drugs. In 17 of 26 incidents, either the
neuromuscular blocker was inadvertently given instead
of another drug or another drug was given instead. The
reason could be the use of 5-ml syringes for both
nondepolarising muscle relaxants and narcotic dilutions at
our institution. This practice is now being altered. In
1984, Cooper et al. [15] reported on commonly described
critical incidents; syringe swap was one of the most
frequently cited.
Seventy-seven percent of our errors were classified as
preventable and 23% as nonpreventable. There was a
difference between the drug incidents for the first 3 years
(1997–99) and those for the subsequent 3 years (2000–
2002). In the former period, 63 incidents were reported,
compared to 102 in the later. The difference was mainly
seen in errors of underdosage and syringe swap, where
the incidences increased in the later period. Awareness of
residents and faculty in reporting incidents, or the
constant change-over of residents and anaesthesia techni-
cians could have led to more errors occurring. The trend
in the department has also changed; more syringe pump
infusions, especially for muscle relaxants, are now used.
A suggested approach in the management of errors is
to find out what is occurring, collate the information,
categorise problems, contributing factors and errors,
particularly identifying the latent errors, and then to
develop preventable strategies. After these strategies are in
place it is necessary to assess their effectiveness [8]. It has
also been suggested that even in the case of heterogeneous
results, targeting high priority areas could decrease the
overall frequency of events [16]. Quality Assurance Issues
(QAI) meetings in our department were started in the
year 2000, at which selected errors that are picked up
from the critical incident list are discussed and appropriate
changes made, or guidelines formulated. Following the
above approach we attempted to determine the latent
errors in this audit. The importance of the contribution of
latent errors to the occurrence of major disaster is well
known [17]. Latent errors are defined as problems that
management can address [2]. Incidents caused by latent
errors do not recur after their removal. The latent errors
that have been identified in this audit relate to labelling of
drugs in the operating theatre, use of ward cannula for
intravenous induction, presence of ampoules at the wrong
site, missing information of timing of drug preparation on
the syringe label, and communication between the
anaesthetic technician and anaesthetist. Some of these
have been addressed at our QAI meetings and others will
be taken up soon.
The main lessons learnt from these errors were that:
• neuromuscular blockers were the largest pharmacolo-
gical group involved in drug errors;
• preventive strategies for continuing technician and
resident education needed to be put in place as both
these groups had a certain yearly attrition rate.
In errors relating to muscle relaxants, the majority of
incidents involved atracurium. A possible latent error
involving a storage problem was thought to be respon-
sible in a number of cases and was looked at in detail.
The drug is imported by pharmaceutical companies and
sometimes involves procedures beyond institutional con-
trol, e.g. storage at custom or company warehouses. If the
drug is not stored properly, its efficacy can be affected,
especially in tropical countries. We have tried to improve
guidelines regarding storage in our own pharmacy and
department. It is also now mandatory to write the time of
drawing the drug.
The labelling and presence of drug in inappropriate
locations also accounted for 15 errors. Earlier studies have
also highlighted drug related critical incident, the majority
being attributable to failing to read or misreading the label,
mislabelling, confusion with labels, or drugs being present
in the wrong boxes [10, 18]. Labelling of syringes is
compulsory in our department but previously the labels
were not colour coded and a simple piece of sticky tape
was used. We have recently introduced the international
colour coded drug labels in our department. This will cost
the patient an extra two rupees (US$ 0.004) per injection,
but this was considered necessary for risk management. It
will be interesting to study whether drug swap errors will
be reduced after the introduction of this system. The other
changes introduced were removal of dangerous drugs such
as potassium chloride from the operating theatre and not
storing ampoules of similar size and appearance next
to each other. Our pharmacy has also introduced the
placement of distinct coloured labels on the ampoules of
dangerous drugs. Drug related errors are now also being
reported to our Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee
on a regular basis so that some institutional strategies could
be put in place.
One of the problems with this method of critical
incidents reporting is that some under-reporting is
inevitable and the absolute frequency of events is not
known. However, awareness of the problem does
increase with recurrent reporting [19]. Studies determin-
ing absolute incidences are expensive [8]. We also plan to
carry out selective audits in future to detect problems not
covered well by incident monitoring.
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In conclusion, this audit has highlighted some areas in
drug usage in our department which need to be addressed
on a priority basis.
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